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Abstract
This paper studies an intermediated market operated by middlemen with high inventory
holdings. I present a directed search model in which middlemen are less likely to experience
a stockout because they have the advantage of inventory capacity, relative to other sellers.
The model explains why popular items are sold at a larger premium, and everyday items at
a larger discount, by large-scaled intermediaries. The concentration of middlemen’s market,
i.e., few middlemen, each with large capacity, can lead to a higher matching efficiency, but
with a lower total welfare, compared to having many middlemen, each with small capacity.
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1 Introduction
According to the “Used Car Market Report in 2007,” produced by Manheim Consulting, about 65.7%
of the 42.6 million U.S. used car sales in 2006 were from dealers. The average transacted price of a
used vehicle was $10,875 for franchised dealers, $8,675 for independent dealers, and $4,450 for private
sellers. They note that the main reason for these differences was that large-scale dealers have greater
control over their used vehicle inventory, as a result of their active stocking of popular brands.
This paper studies the functioning of markets with middlemen (e.g. retailers, wholesalers, trading
entrepreneurs, dealers or brokers of services and durable goods and assets). One important feature of
such a market is that a middleman’s high inventory capacity can influence buyers’ search decision: the
stocks maintained by middlemen are valuable to those who wish to save time and effort that would
have to be spent on searching on an individual basis.1 The above evidence further suggests that the
middlemen’s capacity can not only attract many buyers, but also allow them to charge a premium
for the immediacy service it provides. The immediacy premium appears more clearly for popular
merchandise as shown by Dana and Spier (2001): Conducting a survey about four new releases at 20
rental video outlets within a local market, they find that Blockbuster Video (the leading intermediary
in the rental video industry, who had adopted the policy to increase its stocks of new-releases) charged
$3.81 and had 86% availability on average, whereas the corresponding numbers were $3.32 and 60% for
other national chains, and $2.62 and 48% for the independent stores.
In the existing literature, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) is the first to show that an intermediated
market can be active under frictions, when it is operated by middlemen who have an advantage in
the meeting rate over the original suppliers. Given some exogenous meeting process, two main reasons
have been considered for the middlemen’s advantage in the rate of successful trades: a middleman
may be able to guarantee the quality of goods (Biglaiser, 1993, Li, 1998), or to satisfy buyers’ demand
for a varieties of goods (Shevichenko, 2004). While these are clearly sound reasons for the success
of middlemen, the buyers’ search is modeled as an undirected random matching process, thereby the
middlemen’s capacity cannot influence buyers’ search decisions in these models.
1For most grocery items, electronics, toys, or video rentals, stockout is a major cause of customer dissatisfaction
(Andersen 1996), even in the mail-order catalog transactions (Fitzsimons, 2000). In financial markets, when Stigler
(1964) and Demsetz (1968) analyzed the role of dealers, they viewed dealers as the suppliers of immediacy to the market.
To determine the costs to buyers and sellers of using the NYSE to contract with each other, Demsetz captured the
compensation to the dealer by “the markup that is paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in organized markets; in
other markets, it is the inventory markup of retailer or wholesaler” (p. 36).
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This paper presents a model which allows us to study explicitly the dependence of both the buyers’
search decision and the middlemen’s price decision on their inventory capacity, based on a directed
search approach2. This is an important issue that has never been addressed in the existing literature.
In my framework, the middlemen’s capacity enables them to serve many buyers at a time. As buyers
value the immediacy under market frictions, the price charged by middlemen includes a premium even
though the buyers and the products are homogeneous. Thus, the inventory maintained by middlemen
can influence not only the matching efficiency, but also their market power.
More precisely, I consider retail markets that are operated by middlemen and sellers. In the retail
markets, the only difference between sellers and middlemen is the selling capacity backed by inventories.
Middlemen can stock their inventories in the competitive wholesale markets operated by sellers (i.e.,
producers).3 Buyers have limited search time and their search activities are on an uncoordinated
basis. Under these frictions, the middlemen’s advantage in the selling capacity provides buyers with a
lower likelihood of experiencing a stockout. Thus, the price difference between sellers and middlemen
determines the retail premium charged for the more sure service rate, i.e. the immediacy service.
In this economy, the retail prices decrease with the number of middlemen because it leads to
more competitive (i.e., less tight) retail markets, as is standard in the directed/competitive search
literature. However, the middlemen’s inventory capacity has non-trivial effects on prices. On one hand,
a larger inventory makes it less likely that excess demand occurs at individual middlemen, generating
a downward pressure on the middlemen’s price. On the other hand, it influences the search decision of
buyers: a larger capacity of a middleman can attract more buyers. This effect creates a tighter market
that allows to charge a higher price, since the middleman knows that buyers receive zero payoff in the
event of a stockout. These conflicting effects cause a non-monotonic response of the price to capacities:
it goes up (down) when the initial total supply is scarce (abundant). This is because the stockout
probability is initially high (low) in the former (latter) situation, thereby buyers are prepared to pay a
higher premium for a larger inventory when the the initial scarcity of resources is higher.
2Unlike in traditional random matching models, directed search equilibria incorporate competition among sellers and
buyers’ choice of where to search. See, for example, Accemoglu and Shimer (1999), Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006,
2010), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Camera and Selcuk (2009), Coles and Eeckhout (2003), Faig and Jerez (2005),
Galenianos and Kircher (2008), Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010), Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), McAfee (1993),
Menzio (2007), Moen (1997), Montogomery (1991), Peters (1991), Shi (2002ab), and Watanabe (2006, 2010).
3This assumption is for analytical tractability, and guarantees the middlemen’s inventory to be deterministic and
identical to individuals across all the periods. It is related to the one adopted in a monetary model of Lagos and Wright
(2005) who establish a monetary equilibrium with a degenerate distribution of divisible money holdings in the presence
of market frictions that could potentially lead to a complicated stochastic evolution of individual money balances.
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This result may help us understand why popular items are sold at a larger premium by larger scaled
intermediaries, as is the case of popular brands of used cars or newly-released rental videos, whereas
everyday items are often sold at a larger discount by big supermarkets especially when they hold an
excessive amount of inventories.4
The non-monotonicity of price has an interesting efficiency implication of the middlemen’s market.
The middlemen in this economy are efficiency enhancing, since their capacity can mitigate market
frictions. Further, the concentration of middlemen’s market, i.e., having fewer middleman, each with
larger capacity, leads to a larger number of trades, which improves the matching efficiency. However,
it does not necessarily accompany an increase in welfare. Indeed, the concentration of middlemen can
deteriorate the welfare when the total supply is scarce, in which case the price increase is more than
enough to offset the gain from the improved service rate. This result points to the tension between the
matching efficiency and the economic welfare generated by the concentration of middlemen’s market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. This introductory section closes with more detailed
discussions on the related literature. Section 2 presents the basic setup and studies the steady state
equilibrium allocations. Section 3 provides a characterization of the retail price differentials. Section 4
extends the analysis to allow for the free entry of middlemen. It is shown that the number of middlemen
can be non-monotone in their capacity. Section 5 investigates the matching efficiency and the welfare.
Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literature: This study contributes to the literature of middlemen, initiated by Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1987), that emphasizes the middlemen’s advantage over the original suppliers in the
rate at which they meet buyers. In their model, it is assumed that: (i) the matching rates of agents
are exogenous; (ii) the terms of trades are determined by Nash bargaining; (iii) middlemen can hold
only one unit of a good as inventory. In contrast, my approach is based on a standard directed search
equilibrium and allows me to study both the matching advantage of middlemen and its influence on
their market power, because it incorporates: (i) buyers’ choice of where to search so that the matching
rate between buyers and suppliers is determined endogenously; (ii) competition among suppliers so
4Aguirregabiria (2005) finds that intermediaries’ inventory is a critical variable to explain their pricing patterns in a
supermarket chain, especially when customers trade-off the price against the service rate. Aguirregabiria (1999) identifies
a negative effect of inventory ordering on the retail prices for groceries. A related evidence provided by Matsa (2009)
shows that stockouts are negatively correlated with competition: supermarkets that face significantly high competition
offer on average 5 percent lower stockout rates than otherwise similar stores.
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that individual suppliers can influence the search-purchase behaviors of buyers through prices; (iii)
middlemen’s inventory holdings of more than one unit so that the dependence of both the buyers’
search decision and the extent of competition on their inventory can be made explicit.
There are two papers in this literature that are closely related to the current study.5 Shevichenko
(2004) provides a random meeting model that allows for middlemen to hold a variety of goods as
inventory with ex ante heterogeneity of products and preferences. The middlemen studied in his model
are agents who can mitigate the severity of double-coincidence of wants problem. In his model, the
price is determined by Nash bargaining, and the equilibrium price is dispersed with respect to the
type of goods held by middlemen. By holding a larger variety of goods as inventory, middlemen can
increase the chance that a random buyer finds his preferred good on their shelves, which may or may
not improve their terms of trade. However, the inventory capacity does not affect the rate at which a
random buyer meets with a middleman. In contrast to Shevichenko (2004), even though agents and
goods are both homogeneous in my model, the inventory capacity of middlemen can affect their meeting
rate with buyers, generating the buyers’ tradeoff between the price and the matching rate. It is exactly
this simple tradeoff that yields the differential equilibrium prices across sellers with different capacities
and the differential degree of retail market competition depending on the capacity level.
In a companion paper, Watanabe (2010) presents a special case of the current model and studies
the turnover behaviors of sellers to become middlemen under a simplifying assumption of infinite
discounting. It is shown that turnover equilibrium can be multiple – one is stable and has many
middlemen, each with few units and a high price, and the other is unstable and has few middlemen,
each with many units and a low price. Assuming away the turnover issue, the current paper investigates
the effect of middlemen’s inventory capacities on the market outcomes. This issue is perhaps more
relevant for the directed search approach to study the functioning of markets with middlemen.
This paper is also related to the recent literature on financial intermediaries pioneered by Duffie,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005). They use a bargaining-based search model, together with time varying
preference shocks, to formulate the trading frictions that are characteristic of over-the-counter markets.
5In the literature, Biglaiser (1993) and Li (1998) model middlemen as a guaranteer of product qualities, who help
to ameliorate lemons problems, and Masters (2007) and Watanabe (2010) endogenize the decision of agents to become
a middleman. In another approach used in Gehrig (1993), Spulber (1996), Rust and Hall (2003), Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), Hendershott and Zhang (2006) and Loertscher (2007) (see also the book by Spulber (1999)), price setting is
emphasized as the middlemen’s main role of market-makings, but the meeting rate is exogenous. For further issues, see,
for instance, Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009), Johri and Leach (2002), Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2012),
Smith (2004), and Wong and Wright (2011).
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On the methodological side, there are situations in which the notion of directed search might provide
a better description of pricing and trading mechanisms than the standard model with bargaining and
random search. For instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 11Ac1-5, later redesignated
as Rule 605 of the National Market System Regulation, requires market centers to report various
execution quality statistics (so called Dash 5 reports) in publicly traded securities. The information
made available by each market center includes time of execution and trading costs (such as effective bid-
ask spreads) on a stock-by-stock basis. Similarly, broker/dealers in over the counter secondary market
have an obligation to report transactions in corporate bonds to the Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine. This type of information is consistent with the notion of directed search. Further, analyzing
execution quality on Nasdaq and the NYSE using the Dash-5 data, Boehmer (2005) finds that high
execution costs are systematically associated with fast execution speed, and low costs are associated
with slow execution speed. This relationship holds both across markets and across order sizes. This is
the key trade-off that is common in directed search equilibria.
On the positive side, although the details of the modeling setup are different, the current study is
consistent with recent progress in this strand of literature. In particular, Lagos and Rocheteau (2007,
2009) generalize the framework by allowing market participants to hold an unrestricted amount of
assets and show that the (average) bid-ask spread of dealers can be non-monotonic in their bargaining
power or in the contact rate of investors.6 In their model, a higher bargaining power or a lower contact
rate has a positive effect on the spread, and changes the distribution of trade sizes, which can have an
adverse effect on the spread. The latter effect can be considered as a general equilibrium effect that
occurs through changes in the investors’ hedging behaviors against the future preference shocks. My
model shows there is non-monotonicity in the capacity of dealers. This result arises due to a rather
simple tradeoff faced by traders between the price and the (endogenous) matching probability: traders
are willing to pay a higher premium for a larger inventory of dealers when the total supply is scarce.
Another difference is that in my model, agents are allowed to trade directly with each other and the
premium for dealers is defined over this option, whereas the dealers are the only avenue of exchange in
their model and the premium is defined with respect to no trade.
6Other papers in this literature include Afonso (2010), Ga´rleanu (2009), Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2010), Miao
(2006), Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Weill (2007, 2008). In the finance literature, the formal
models (without search frictions) emphasizing the relationship between the dealers’ inventory holdings and the bid-ask
spread are developed, for example, Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), and Hendershott
and Menkveld (2009).
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Finally, in the directed/competitive search literature, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001)7 and Shi
(2001a) are the first to study the buyers’ tradeoff between the price and the service probability for
sellers with different capacities, assuming that the capacity level of high-capacity sellers is km = 2.
Generalizing km ≥ 1, this paper identifies a case in which the price differential in the retail market (i.e.,
retail premium) is not necessarily monotone in km. This leads to an interesting efficiency implication
of the concentration of large firms: an economy with few firms, each with large capacity, can lead to a
higher matching efficiency, but with a higher (lower) total welfare when the total supply is abundant
(scarce), compared to having many firms, each with small capacity.8 The essence of this welfare impli-
cation is neither about cost considerations, nor increasing returns to scale in production technologies,
but about the way in which firms should mitigate market frictions.
2 Model
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of homogeneous buyers, sellers and middlemen, indexed
b, s and m, respectively. The population of buyers is normalized to one, and the population of sellers
and middlemen are denoted by S and M , respectively. The population of agents are constant over
time. All agents are risk-neutral and infinitely lived. Time is discrete and each period is divided into
two subperiods. During the first subperiod, a retail market is open for a homogeneous, indivisible
good to buyers. The good is storable. This retail market is operated by sellers and middlemen, and is
subject to search frictions as described in detail below. Each period, buyers have unit demand while
each seller can sell ks = 1 unit, and each middleman can sell km ≥ 1 units of the good. The selling
capacity of suppliers ki is exogenously given, for both i = s,m. The consumption value of the good is
normalized to unity. If a buyer successfully purchases in the retail market at a price p, then he obtains
the per-period utility of one. Otherwise, he receives zero utility that period. A seller or a middleman
7In Coles and Eeckhout (2003), sellers can post a more general trading mechanism for a finite number of agents.
They show that a continuum of equilibria exist including an equilibrium with a simple form of price posting (i.e., the
one studied in Burdett, Shi and Wright), while sellers prefer an equilibrium with auction. With a continuum of agents,
auction and price posting are practically equivalent, with sellers achieving the same revenue and guaranteeing buyers the
same utility. A usual argument applies: relatively high transaction costs associated with establishing and implementing
auction can make sellers prefer price posting. This makes sense in particular for the economy considered here where retail
technologies are made explicit and play an important economic role for middlemen’s profits.
8Moen (1997), Mortensen and Wright (2002), and Sattinger (2003) consider fictitious market makers (not middlemen),
who replace the Warlasian auctioneer, to interpret the efficiency property of competitive search equilibrium: Given the
market makers create different submarkets and announce a pair of price and service probability in each submarket, buyers
and sellers are willing to trade in a submarket where the Hosios condition holds endogenously. The latter property holds
true in the equilibrium with middlemen constructed in my model.
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who sells z units at a price p obtains the revenue zp during the first subperiod.
Once the retail market is closed, another market opens during the second subperiod. This is a
wholesale market operated by sellers, and middlemen can restock their units for the future retail
markets.9 There is no search friction in the wholesale market and the price is determined competitively.
Sellers decide whether to produce for the current wholesale market and for the future retail market.
The production cost is measured in terms of utility and is given by c < 1. Agents discount future
payoffs at a rate β ∈ [0, 1) across periods, but there is no discounting between the two sub-periods.
The environment in the retail market each period is the same as in the standard competitive/directed
search models (see, for example, Accemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001),
Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991)). Any given first subperiod can be described as a simple two-stage
game. In the first stage, sellers and middlemen simultaneously post a price which they are willing to
sell at. Observing the prices, all buyers simultaneously decide which seller or middleman to visit in
the second stage. Each buyer can visit one seller or one middleman. If more buyers visit a seller or
middleman than its selling capacity, then the unit or units are allocated randomly. Assuming buyers
cannot coordinate their actions over which seller or middleman to visit, a symmetric equilibrium is
investigated where all buyers use the identical mixed strategy for any configuration of the announced
prices. I focus my attention on a steady-state equilibrium where all sellers post the identical price ps
and all middlemen post the identical price pm every period.
In any given period, each individual seller or middleman is characterized by an expected queue of
buyers, denoted by x. The number of buyers visiting a given seller or middleman who has expected
queue x is a random variable, denoted by n, which has the Poisson distribution, Prob.(n = k) = e
−xxk
k! .
In a symmetric equilibrium where xi is the expected queue of buyers at i, each buyer visits some seller
(and some middleman) with probability Sxs (andMxm). They should satisfy the adding-up restriction,
Mxm + Sxs = 1, (1)
requiring that the number of buyers visiting individual sellers and middlemen be summed up to the
total population of buyers. The buyer’s probability of being served by a supplier i depend on the queue
xi and the selling capacity ki, and is denoted by η(xi, ki).
9The timing of events is irrelevant here – the entire analysis remains unchanged with an alternative setting in which
the retail market occurs in the second subperiod or production occurs in the retail market rather than in the restocking
market. Also, one could alternatively assume that buyers own an income measured in terms of numeraire (or a compound
good) and use it for buying the good in question. Here, I have selected the simplest possible setup.
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In steady state, each seller holds ks = 1 unit and each middleman holds km ≥ 1 units at the start of
every period. As the wholesale market is competitive, middlemen can restock at the sellers’ reservation
price c. That is, if the average quantity of sale by each individual middleman is xmη(xm, km) in the
retail market, then in total Mxmη(xm, km) units are supplied to the wholesale market, which clears at
price c.10 Simultaneously, sellers produce another unit for the next retail market, if the production cost
is not too high, and if they have successfully sold in the retail market – holding more than one unit is
never optimal since sellers only have the selling capacity of ks = 1 in the retail market. This quantity
amounts to Sxsη(xs, 1) units in total. Hence, in a steady state equilibrium, each seller holds ks = 1
unit and each middleman holds km ≥ 1 units, and the total units produced and consumed amount to
Mxmη(xm, km) + Sxsη(xs, 1)
each period.
Buyers’ directed search Assuming for the moment the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, the
following lemma computes the buyer’s probability of being served by a supplier i who has capacity ki.
The derivation is given in Watanabe (2006) (see also Watanabe (2010) for the finite agents version).
Lemma 1 Given xi > 0 and ki ≥ 1, the buyer’s probability of being served by a supplier i that has
capacity ki is given by the following closed form expression.
η(xi, ki) =
Γ (ki, xi)
Γ (ki)
+
ki
xi
(
1− Γ (ki + 1, xi)
Γ (ki + 1)
)
where Γ (k) =
∫∞
0
tk−1e−tdt and Γ (k, x) =
∫∞
x
tk−1e−tdt. η(·) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in xi
(in ki) and satisfies η(xs, 1) = 1−e
−xs
xs
.
Given η(·) described above, I now characterize the expected queue of buyers. In any equilibrium
where Vb is the value of a buyer, should a seller or a middleman deviate by setting price p in a period,
the expected queue of buyers denoted by x satisfies11
V b = η(x, ki) (1− p) + βV b. (2)
10Below, it is assumed that the capacity constraint of suppliers is binding for a middleman, so that he accumulates
inventories up to the limit km. In financial markets, it can be justified by the reserve/capacity requirement. In other
markets, one can assume a significantly high costs of maintaining an unfilled capacity or displaying unfilled shelves due
to reputation concerns. To endogenize km is technically more involved and will be left for future research.
11See Peters (1991) for more issues on this large market property. Watanabe (2010) shows that the market equilibrium
presented in this section is identical to the limiting solution in a finite setup counterpart as the population gets large.
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A buyer choosing p is served with probability η(x, ki) in which case he obtains per-period utility 1− p.
If not served by the seller or middleman, the buyer’s payoff is zero that period. Irrespective of whether
or not to be served, he enters the next period and his continuation value is βV b. The situation is the
same for all the other buyers. (2) is an implicit equation that determines x = x(p, ki | V b) ∈ (0,∞) as
a strictly decreasing function of p given β, ki and V b.
Optimal pricing Given the directed search of buyers described above, the next step is to characterize
the equilibrium retail prices. In any equilibrium where V b is the value of a buyer and where middlemen
restock at the sellers’ reservation price c in the Walrasian market, the optimal retail price of a supplier
i who has a capacity ki, denoted by pi(V b), satisfies
pi(V b) = argmaxp
[
x(p, ki | V b)η(x(p, ki | V b), ki)(p− c)
]
.
For i = s, a seller sells its good at price p with probability x(p, 1·)η(x(p, 1·), 1), and produces a new
unit with cost c for the next period. If unsuccessful in the retail market, then the seller’s payoff is
zero: if it sells the current unit to a middleman in the second subperiod, then it receives c from the
middleman and produces a new unit for the next period with cost c; otherwise, the seller receives
nothing and carries its unit into the next period. For i = m, a middleman’s expected number of sales
is x(p, km·)η(x(p, km·), km), and it restocks at the competitive price c.
Substituting out p using (2), p = 1 − 1−βη(·) V b, the objective function of a supplier i, denoted by
Πi(x), can be written as
Πi(x) = xη(x, ki)(1− c)− x(1− β)V b
where x = x(p, ki | V b) satisfies (2). The first-order condition is
∂Πi(x)
∂x
=
(
η(x, ki) + x
∂η(x, ki)
∂x
)
(1− c)− (1− β)V b = 0
for both i = s,m.12 Rearranging the first order condition above using (2) and
∂η(x, ki)
∂x
= − ki
x2
(
1− Γ (ki + 1, x)
Γ (ki + 1)
)
,
12The second-order condition is satisfied as it holds that for both i = s,m
∂2Πi(x)
∂x2
= −x
ki−1e−x
Γ(ki)
(1− c) < 0.
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one can obtain the optimal price of the seller (if i = s) or the middleman (if i = m),
pi(V b) = c+ ϕi(x, ki)(1− c) (3)
where
ϕi(x, ki) ≡ −∂η(x, ki)/∂x
η(x, ki)/x
is the elasticity of the matching rate of buyers.
Existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium
Definition 1 Given the population parameters S,M , the selling capacity ki, i = s,m, the production
cost c, and the discount factor β, a steady state equilibrium is a set of expected values V j for j = b, s,m,
and market outcomes xi, pi for i = s,m such that:
1. Buyers’ directed search satisfies (1) and (2);
2. Sellers’ and middlemen’s retail prices satisfy the first-order conditions (3) for i = s,m;
3. Middlemen restock their inventories in the wholesale market at the competitive price c. Each
Middleman holds km ≥ 1 units and each seller holds ks = 1 unit in the retail market;
4. Agents have rational expectations. An agent j = b, s,m receives (1− β)V j each period.
The analysis above has established the equilibrium prices pi(V b) given V b. Equilibrium implies
buyers are indifferent between any of the individual suppliers i = s,m, leading to
(1− β)V b = η(xs, 1)(1− ps) (4)
= η(xm, km)(1− pm), (5)
where xi = x(pi, ki | V b) is the equilibrium queue of buyers at i = s,m. Buyers successfully purchase
the good from the seller or middleman with probability η(xi, ki) each period. The value of sellers and
middlemen are given by
(1− β)V s = xsη(xs, 1)(ps − c) (6)
(1− β)V m = xmη(xm, km)(pm − c), (7)
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respectively. Sellers produce with cost c whenever needed, and middlemen restock at the competitive
price c each period. To solve for the equilibrium, it is important to observe that indifference condi-
tions (4) and (5) can be reduced to the following simple form: applying (3) for i = s to (4) with a
rearrangement,
(1− β)V b
1− c = η(xs, 1)(1− ϕ
s(xs, 1)) = e−xs ;
similarly, applying (3) for i = m to (5) with a rearrangement,
(1− β)V b
1− c = η(xm, km)(1− ϕ
m(xm, km)) =
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
;
these two equations imply
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
= e−xs . (8)
The adding-up restriction (1) and the indifference condition (8) identify an equilibrium allocation
xs, xm > 0.
Theorem 1 (Steady state equilibrium) Given c ∈ [0, c¯], some c¯ ∈ (0, β), a steady state equilibrium
exists and is unique for all β ∈ [0, 1), S ∈ (0,∞), M ∈ (0,∞) km ≥ 1, satisfying V b ∈ (0, 1−c1−β ),
xs ∈ (0, 1S+M ], xm ∈ [ 1S+M , 1M ), pi ∈ (c, 1), and V i ∈ (0, ki(1−c)1−β ), i = s,m.
At the start of each period, all sellers hold one unit and all middlemen hold km ≥ 1 units in the
retail market. Sellers produce for the retail market given that production costs are not that high
c ≤ c¯, and middlemen restock in the competitive wholesale market operated by sellers each period.
The equilibrium allocation of buyers xs, xm > 0 is determined irrespective of the discount factor β and
production cost c each period by (1) and (8). When km = 1, there is no difference between sellers
and middlemen in the retail market and so all sellers and middlemen receive the identical number of
buyers xs = xm and post the identical price ps = pm. The indifference condition (8), combined with
the adding up restriction, suggests that a supplier with a larger capacity should accommodate more
buyers. Hence, an increase in the middlemen’s capacity km induces more buyers to visit middlemen
and fewer buyers to visit sellers, resulting in an increase in xm and a decrease in xs. An increase in
the proportion of sellers S or middlemen M leads to a fewer number of buyers per each supplier, which
decreases xs, xm.
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3 Retail market prices
In this section, I study the behaviors of the retail prices. I begin by showing that the usual market-
tightness effect leads to a lower price, as is standard in the directed/ competitive search literature.
Proposition 1 (Market tightness effect) An increase in the population of sellers S or middlemen
M (relative to that of buyers) leads to a lower retail market price pi, i = s,m.
As is consistent with the standard framework, the market-tightness effect implies that a larger supply
makes the retail market less tight and more competitive, leading to a lower retail price.
I now investigate the comparative statistics results of middlemen’s capacity km on the retail prices.
In the current framework, the retail price differential, i.e., the price difference between sellers and
middlemen in the retail market, is given by
pm − ps = [ϕm(xm, km)− ϕs(xs, 1)](1− c),
where ϕi(xi, ki) represents the supplier i’s share of the net trading surplus 1− c (see (3)).
Proposition 2 (Retail market premium) For all S,M ∈ (0,∞), the retail market premium of
middlemen is zero when km = 1 and is strictly positive when 1 < km <∞.
When km = 1, there is no difference between sellers and middlemen in the retail market, and so the
premium is zero. When km > 1, the price of middlemen is higher than that of sellers. The positive
premium reflects the immediacy, or a relatively high rate of being served η(xm, km) > η(xs, 1), that
middlemen provide with its selling capacity km > 1. Below, I show that the behavior of pm shapes
critically that of the retail market premium.
The equilibrium price of middlemen is given by
pm = c+ ϕm(x, km)(1− c)
where
ϕm(xm, km) =
1− Γ(km+1,x)Γ(km+1)
xmη(xm, km)/km
.
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Here, the denominator xmη(·)/km represents the average probability of selling any given single unit,
and the numerator,
Prob.(n > km) =
∞∑
n=km+1
e−xmxnm
n!
= 1− Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
,
represents the stock-out probability of an individual middleman – the probability that the number of
buyers visiting the middleman n is strictly greater than its capacity km.13 The stockout probability is
decreasing in the capacity km and is increasing in the queue of buyers xm.
There are two important effects of an increase in the capacity of middlemen km on their price pm.
On the one hand, a larger capacity of a middleman implies a smaller likelihood of excess demand and a
smaller stockout probability of the middleman, given xm. On the other hand, an increase in km implies
an increase in the number of buyers to visit middlemen, rather than sellers. The latter effect makes the
middlemen’s market tighter and increases the stockout probability of individual middlemen. Suppose
that the latter effect is large enough to make the price of middlemen increase with their capacity. Then,
it means that middlemen can extract a larger share of trading surplus from buyers, since they know
that buyers receive zero payoff in the event of stockouts. Conversely, suppose that the increase in xm is
relatively small, so that a middleman has a smaller likelihood of successfully selling out its entire units
and its stockout becomes less likely. Then, buyers can receive a larger surplus share per unit, since
buyers know that the middleman receives zero payoff from unsold units. Hereafter, I normalize S = 1,
to simplify the analysis. Denote by
X ≡ 1
Mkm + 1
< 1
the per-period ratio of the total demand to the total supply in the retail market.
Proposition 3 (Retail market prices/differential) 1. The retail price of middlemen pm is in-
creasing in sufficiently low km, if and only if X > X∗ ∈ (0, 1), and is decreasing in sufficiently
large km for any given X ∈ (0, 1).
2. The retail price of sellers ps is decreasing in all km, for any given X ∈ (0, 1).
3. The retail market differential pm − ps ≥ 0 is increasing in sufficiently low km and is decreasing
in sufficiently large km for any given X ∈ (0, 1).
13The second equation follows from the series definition of cumulative gamma function,
Pk
n=0
e−xxn
n!
=
Γ(k+1,x)
Γ(k+1)
.
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Figure 1: Retail price of middlemen
Figure 1 plots the behaviors of the price pm and Figure 2 the behaviors of the price differential
pm − ps in response to changes in the middlemen’s capacity km, for given values of M (and hence X).
The non-monotonicity occurs because more buyers visit middlemen as their capacity increases. For
relatively small km, the stockout probability is relatively high given values of xm. Since the increase
in the number of buyers visiting middlemen xm is sufficiently large when the total demand X is high,
an increase in km can make a tighter middlemen’s market and result in a higher price pm, if km (X) is
initially low (high). For relatively large km, the total demand ratio is relatively low and the stockout
probability is already low. In this situation, a larger km leads to an increase in the total supply that
makes it less likely that an excess demand occurs at individual middlemen, resulting in a lower price.
Unlike pm, the sellers’s price ps is monotone decreasing in km, because the sellers’ market gets less tight
as km increases. This implies, the non-monotonicity of the retail market differential, pm − ps, is driven
by that of the middlemen’s price: there is a larger (smaller) premium for a larger selling capacity of
middlemen when the total demand ratio X is initially high (low).
Notice that in the above analysis, changes in km affect the total supply. To abstract it from the
effects of changes in the total demand-supply ratio, I examine the same comparative statistics exercise
but, this time, fixing the middlemen’s total supply denoted by G =Mkm.
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Figure 2: Retail price differentials
Proposition 4 (Fixed supply in middlemen’s market) Fix the total supply by middlemen G =
Mkm.
1. The retail price of middlemen pm is increasing in sufficiently low km, if X = 1G+1 > X
∗ ∈ (0, 1),
and the retail market differential pm − ps ≥ 0 is increasing in sufficiently low km for any given
X ∈ (0, 1)
2. The retail price of middlemen and the retail price differential satisfy pm → c and pm − ps → 0,
respectively, when X < X∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), and pm > c and pm − ps > 0 when X > X∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), for
sufficiently large km.
The fixed total supply G = Mkm generates two margins: one is the intensive margin (as already seen
above) and the other is the extensive margin, where M decreases with km. As the extensive margin
implies a price increase, the item 1 in Proposition 4 shows that the condition of price increase with
low km is less stringent than before. The item 2 shows that with fixed total supply in the middlemen’s
market, the price of middlemen pm can be above the marginal cost c and the price differential can be
positive pm − ps > 0 even for large km: when the total demand ratio X = 1G+1 is relatively high, the
number of buyers to middlemen xm increases large enough to make the middlemen’s market tighter.
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Figure 3 (a) plots the behavior of pm and Figure 3 (b) that of price differential pm − ps, with different
values of X. With fixed supply, the retail price/premium of middlemen can be substantially high for
large km, especially when the total demand X is relatively high.
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Figure 3: Concentration of middlemen’s market
4 Free entry equilibrium
In this section, I allow for the number of middlemen to be determined endogenously by free entry.
So far, I have implicity assumed that middlemen hold the initial endowment km at the start of their
lifetime period. Suppose now that the initial endowment can be obtained by paying ckm > 0 from
the sellers’ market, where as before c > 0 represents the wholesale price. Middlemen possess the
inventory management technologies that enable them to operate with a relatively large selling capacity
in the retail market. Denote by ck the latter cost of inventory management per unit payed period
by period.14 An agent chooses to be a middlemen if the value of being a middlemen is non-negative,
−(c + ck1−β )km + V m ≥ 0, given values of km ≥ 1 and M > 0. A symmetric free entry equilibrium
is a steady state equilibrium described in Theorem 1 where entry and exit occur until the middlemen
operating in the markets earn zero expected net profits, just to cover the cost. The equilibrium number
14All the results presented below go through with non linear management costs, as long as the marginal cost is not
highly nonlinear in km.
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of middlemen M > 0 is determined by the free entry condition, V m = (c+ ck1−β )km, or(
1− Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
)
1− c
1− β = c+
ck
1− β , (9)
where the L.H.S. represents the per-unit profit of middlemen (apply the price in (3), i = m, to the
value V m in (7)) and the R.H.S. the lifetime per-unit cost. Define the total per-unit cost per period as
C ≡ c(1−β)+ck1−c and its upper bound as C¯ ≡ limM→0 1− Γ(km+1,xm)Γ(km+1) ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 4: Free entry equilibrium
Proposition 5 (Free entry equilibrium) Given values of C ∈ (0, C¯), a free entry equilibrium exists
and is unique. The equilibrium number of middlemen M ∈ (0,∞) is: monotone decreasing in C;
increasing in low km if and only if C > C∗ ∈ (0, C¯); decreasing in large km for any C ∈ (0, C¯).
The per-unit profit (i.e., L.H.S. of (9)) is decreasing in the number of middlemen, thereby a larger
cost leads to fewer middlemen given values of km. Figure 4 plots the number of middlemen M and
km, for different values of C. The equilibrium number of middlemen can be non monotone in km
when C is relatively high.15 Notice that the per-unit profit is proportional to the stockout probability,
1− Γ(km+1,xm)Γ(km+1) , thereby a similar logic to the one stated before applies to the non-monotonicity of M :
15Through these effects, the price of middlemen can be non-monotonic in km. The analysis is available upon request.
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when the total per-unit cost C is high and the initial units km are low, the number of middlemen is
initially small and the total demand-supply ratio X is initially high. In this situation, a larger km can
generate a tighter market of middlemen and increase the profitability of operating as a middleman.
Hence, the number of middlemen increases with low km when C is high. The opposite happens when
C is low or km is high, since in such a case, a larger km makes it more likely that middlemen remain
their units unsold, which reduces their profits and the number of operating middlemen.
5 Efficiency and welfare
I now study the implications of middlemen’s inventory holdings on the matching efficiency and the
welfare. The per-period total number of trades in this economy, denoted by T , is given by
T =Mxmη(xm, km) + xsη(xs, 1),
and the total welfare net of middlemen’s profits, denoted by W , is given by
W = V b + V s =
e−xs(1− c)
1− β +
(1− exs − xse−xs)(1− c)
1− β =
(1− xse−xs)(1− c)
1− β .
To show first that the middlemen in this economy are efficiency/welfare enhancing, consider an alter-
native economy in which there are no middlemen, and buyers and sellers can trade only in a private
market each period. Let S = Mkm + 1 be the population of sellers. Then, the total number of trades
and the net welfare in this alternative economy are
T = S xsη(xs, 1), W =
(1− xse−xs)(1− c)
1− β ,
respectively, in each period, where xs = 1/S is the queue of buyers at individual sellers. Comparing the
these two economies, which have the same total supply (=Mkm+1) and total demand (normalized to
one) per period, the following proposition shows T ≥ T and W ≥W with strict inequality for km > 1.
Proposition 6 (Efficiency of middlemen) The middlemen in this economy are efficiency enhanc-
ing in terms of the total number of trades and the net welfare.
In our economy, even with fixed total supply, the composition of middlemen’s markets, in terms
of the individual scale km and the number M of middlemen, can affect the number of trades and the
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net welfare. The following proposition shows that the concentration of middlemen’s markets have a
positive impact on the number of trades, but not necessarily on the economic welfare.
Proposition 7 (Efficiency implication of middlemen’s markets) Fix the total supply G =Mkm.
1. The total number of trades T is increasing in both small and large values of km, for all X ∈ (0, 1).
2. The net welfare W is increasing in low km for all X ∈ (0, 1), and satisfies W → 1−c1−β when
X < X∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), and W < 1−c1−β when X > X∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), for sufficiently large km.
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Figure 5: Matching efficiency
The item 1 in the proposition shows that the concentration of middlemen’s market can mitigate the
search frictions in the retail market: few middlemen, each with large scale, lead to a larger total number
of trades than many middlemen, each with small scale. Figure 5 plots the relationship between the
total matching rate T and the selling capacity of middlemen km, for given fixed values of G = Mkm.
However, the item 2 suggests that the concentration of middlemen’s markets does not necessarily
maximize the net welfare: W increases with km if the concentration of middlemen’s market is initially
low, but otherwise can deteriorate when the total demand-supply ratio X is relatively high. Figure 6
plots the relationship between W and km for given values of X. The reason of the welfare decrease is
that when X is high, the demand effect of a larger capacity to increase xm is large, hence the size of
20
price increase is large enough to offset the buyers’ benefit of the improved service rate. All in all, the
result points to the tension between the matching efficiency (measured in terms of the total number of
trades T ) and the welfare, generated by the concentration of middlemen’s market.
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Figure 6: Total welfare
6 Conclusion
This paper proposed a simple theory of middlemen using a standard directed search approach. It
offers wide applicability and economic insights into many empirically relevant forms of middlemen.
Middlemen’s inventories can provide buyers with immediacy service under market frictions, thereby
the retail price of middlemen includes a premium to buyers. The model generates two important effects
of middlemen’s inventories that serve as the critical determinant of the retail premium. On the one
hand, middlemen can attract more buyers with a larger selling capacity, which allows them to charge
a higher price. On the other hand, it puts downward pressure on their retail price. These conflicting
effects cause non-monotonic responses of the retail price/premium to changes in their inventories. The
middlemen in this economy are efficiency enhancing. Interestingly, the concentration of middlemen’s
market introduces the tension between the matching efficiency and the welfare, especially when the
total supply is relatively scarce.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The analysis in the main text has established that (1), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) describe necessary and
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium, given that suppliers i holds ki units at the start of each period.
All that remains here is to establish a solution to these conditions, xs, xm, ps, pm, V b, V s, V m > 0,
exists and is unique. The proof takes 3 steps. Step 1 establishes a unique solution xs, xm > 0 for all
km ≥ 1, S ∈ (0,∞) and M ∈ (0,∞), using (1), (3), (4) and (5). With a slight abuse of notation,
let xi(km, S,M) denote this solution for i = s,m. Given this solution, Step 2 then identifies a unique
solution V j ∈ (0, 1−c1−β ) to (4), (5) and (6) for j = b, s. The rest of the equilibrium values are identified
immediately: given xi, (3) determines a unique pi ∈ (c, 1) for i = s,m; given xm and pm, (7) determines
a unique V m ∈ (0, km(1−c)1−β ). Hence, given the initial units ki, i = s,m, for all β ∈ [0, 1), km ≥ 1,
S ∈ (0,∞), M ∈ (0,∞), c ∈ [0, c¯], this solution then satisfies (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7). Finally,
Step 3 shows that in any period, sellers produce a unit for the retail market given c ≤ c¯, some c¯ ∈ (0, β).
As middlemen restock their units in the Walrasian market each period, this implies all sellers hold ks = 1
unit and all middlemen hold km ≥ 1 units at the start of each period, and so the established solution
is indeed a steady state equilibrium.
Step 1 For any km ≥ 1, S ∈ (0,∞) and M ∈ (0,∞), a solution xi = xi(km, S,M) to (1), (3), (4) and
(5) exists and is unique for i = s,m that is: continuous in S,M, km ∈ R+; strictly decreasing in S,M ;
strictly increasing (or decreasing) in km if i = m (or if i = s) satisfying xs(1, ·) = xm(1, ·) = 1/(S+M),
xs(km, ·)→ 0 and xm(km, ·)→ 1/M as km →∞.
Proof of Step 1. In the main text, it has been shown that (3), (4) and (5) imply (8). Substituting
out xm in (8) by using (1),
Γ
(
km,
1−Sxs
M
)
Γ(km)
= e−xs (10)
where Γ(k) =
∫∞
0
tk−1e−tdt and Γ(k, x) =
∫∞
x
tk−1e−tdt. The L.H.S. of this equation, denoted by
Φ(xs, km, S,M), is continuous and strictly increasing in xs and km ∈ R+, satisfying:
Φ(xs, ·)→
Γ
(
km,
1
M
)
Γ(km)
< 1 as xs → 0; Φ
(
1
S +M
, ·
)
=
Γ
(
km,
1
S+M
)
Γ(km)
≥ e− 1S+M
with equality only when km = 1;
Φ(xs, 1, ·) = e−
1−Sxs
M ; Φ(xs, km, ·)→ 1 as km →∞.
Similarly, Φ(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in S,M for any xs ∈ (0, 1S+M ) and km ≥ 1. It
follows therefore that a unique solution xs = xs(km, S,M) ∈ (0, 1S+M ] exists that is: continuous and
strictly decreasing in km ∈ [1,∞) ⊂ R+ satisfying xs(1, ·) = 1S+M and xs(km, ·) → 0 as km → ∞;
continuous and strictly decreasing in S,M .
Applying this solution to (1), one can obtain a unique solution xm = xm(km, S,M) ∈ [ 1S+M , 1M )
that is: continuous and strictly decreasing in S and M ; continuous and strictly increasing in km ∈
[1,∞) ⊂ R+ satisfying xm(1, ·) = 1S+M and xm(km, ·)→ 1M as km →∞. This completes the proof of
Step 1.
Step 2 Given xs ∈ (0, 1/(S +M)] established in Step 1, there exists a unique solution V j ∈ (0, 1),
j = b, s, to (3), (4), and (6).
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Proof of Step 2. (3), (4), and (6) imply V b satisfies
V b =
e−xs(1− c)
1− β .
The R.H.S of this equation, denoted by Υb(xs), is strictly decreasing in xs ∈ (0,∞) and satisfies:
Υb(·)→ 1−c1−β as xs → 0; Υ(·)→ 0 as xs →∞. As equilibrium implies xs ∈ (0, 1/(S +M)], there exists
a unique V b ∈ (0, 1−c1−β ) that satisfies V b = Υb(·). (3), (4), and (6) also imply
V s =
(1− e−xs − xse−xs)(1− c)
1− β
and this time, the R.H.S. of this equation, denoted by Υs(xs), is strictly increasing in xs ∈ (0,∞)
and satisfies: Υs(·) → 0 as xs → 0; Υs(·) → 1−c1−β as xs → ∞, thereby there exists a unique solution
V s ∈ (0, 1−c1−β ). This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3 Sellers produce a unit for the retail market if c ≤ c¯, some c¯ ∈ (0, β).
Proof of Step 3. Observe that in any given second sub-period, sellers produce a unit for future
sale if and only if
c ≤ β (xsη(xs, 1)ps + (1− xsη(xs, 1))c)
where the R.H.S. represents the expected discounted value of production: the first term in the paren-
thesis is the expected revenue and the second term is the net value of the produced unit in the next
second sub-period – it can be sold to a middleman, which generates c or can be used for saving the
production cost c for the next retail sale. Hence, sellers produce if and only if
c ≤ 1− e
−xs − xse−xs
1− βe−xs(1 + xs) ≡ c¯ ∈ (0, β).
This completes the proof of Step 3. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiation yields
dpi
dS
=
∂ϕi(xi, ·)
∂xi
dxi
dS
(1− c),
for i = s,m. Remember that dxidS < 0, i = s,m (see the proof of Step 2 in Theorem 1). Below, I show
that ∂ϕ
i(xi,·)
∂xi
> 0 for all the possible values of xi. There are three cases.
 Case 1. xi < ki: Observe that
∂ϕi(xm, ·)
∂xi
= −
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki+1,xi)Γ(ki+1)
)
η(·)2
∂η(·)
∂xi
+
∂
∂xi
[
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki+1,xi)Γ(ki+1)
)]
η(·) . (11)
The first term in the R.H.S. of (11) is positive. The numerator of the second term in (11) is
∂
∂xi
[
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki + 1, xi)
Γ(ki + 1)
)]
=
∂
∂xi
 ∞∑
j=ki
xjie
−xi
j!
ki
j + 1
 = ∞∑
j=ki
xj−1i e
−xi(j − xi)
j!
ki
j + 1
> 0
if xi < ki.
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 Case 2. xi ≥ ki and Γ(ki,xi)Γ(ki) ≤
x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
: Rewrite (11) as
xiη(·)2 ∂ϕ
i(xi, ·)
∂xi
=
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
+
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki + 1, xi)
Γ(ki + 1)
)(
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
.
If Γ(ki,xi)Γ(ki) ≤
x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
, then the second term above is positive and so ∂ϕ
i(xi,·)
∂xi
> 0.
 Case 3. xi ≥ ki and Γ(ki,xi)Γ(ki) >
x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
: Using Γ(ki+1,xi)Γ(ki+1) =
Γ(ki,xi)
Γ(ki)
− x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki+1)
, (11) can be further
rearranged to xiη(·)2 ∂ϕ
i(xi,·)
∂xi
=
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
η(xi, ki)− Γ(ki, xi)Γ(ki)
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
+
xki−1i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
=
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
[(
1 +
1
xi
)
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
+
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki + 1, xi)
Γ(ki + 1)
)]
− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
>
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
(
1− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
, (12)
where the last inequality is because it holds that
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
(
1− ki
xi
)(
1− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
>
xkii e
−xi
Γ(ki)
[
1−
(
1 +
1
xi
)
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
− ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki + 1, xi)
Γ(ki + 1)
)]
⇐=
(
1− ki
xi
)(
1− Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
)
> 1−
(
1 +
1
xi
)
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
− ki
xi
(
1− Γ(ki + 1, xi)
Γ(ki + 1)
)
⇐⇒ 1
xi
(
Γ(ki, xi)
Γ(ki)
− x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
)
> 0
for Γ(ki,xi)Γ(ki) >
x
ki
i e
−xi
Γ(ki)
. Now, define
Φg(x, k) ≡ x
ke−x
Γ(k)
− Γ(k, x)
Γ(k)
(
1− Γ(k, x)
Γ(k)
)
for x ≥ k ∈ [1,∞) ⊆ R+. Observe that limx→∞Φg(x, k) = 0, and
∂Φg(x, k)
∂x
=
xk−1e−x
Γ(k)
(
k + 1− x− 2Γ(k, x)
Γ(k)
)
R 0 ⇐⇒ x Q x+
where x+ ∈ (k, k + 1) is a unique solution to x+ = k + 1 − 2Γ(k,x+)Γ(k) , hence ∂Φg(x,k)∂x > 0 at x = k.
Therefore, if Φg(k, k) > 0 then Φg(x, k) > 0 for all x ∈ [k,∞). To show this corner condition Φg(k, k) >
0 holds true, notice first that
Φg(k, k) >
kke−k
Γ(k)
− 1
4
holds true for any k ∈ [1,∞). Now, observe that
d
dk
ln
(
kke−k
Γ(k)
)
= ln(k)− ψ(k),
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where ψ(k) = d ln Γ(k)dk is the Psi (or digamma) function, which has the definite-integral representation
that leads to
ψ(k) =
∫ ∞
0
(
e−t − 1
(1 + t)k
)
dt
t
= ln k − 1
2k
− 2
∫ ∞
0
tdt
(t2 + k2)(e2pit − 1)
(see, for example, Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) p.259). The last expression leads to
d
dk
ln
(
kke−k
Γ(k)
)
=
1
2k
+ 2
∫ ∞
0
tdt
(t2 + k2)(e2pit − 1) > 0,
for all k ∈ [1,∞). Since kke−kΓ(k) = e−1 (' 0.37 > 14 ) when k = 1, this implies that the term k
ke−k
Γ(k) is
greater than 14 . This further implies Φg(k, k) > 0 for all k ∈ [1,∞) and Φg(x, k) > 0 for all x ∈ [k,∞).
This shows that the R.H.S. of (12) is positive and so ∂ϕ
i(xi,·)
∂xi
> 0.
The above covers all the possible cases and, therefore, it has been shown that ∂ϕ
i(xi,·)
∂xi
> 0, for all
xi ∈ (0,∞), i = s,m. The result on parameter M follows from exactly the same procedure. 
Proof of Proposition 2
As given in the test, the retail price differential is
(1− c)−1(pm − ps) = ϕm(·)− ϕs(·) =
km
xm
(
1− Γ(km+1,xm)Γ(km+1)
)
η(xm, km)
−
1−e−xs−xse−xs
xs
η(xs, 1)
.
From this, it follows that η(xm, km)η(xs, 1)(ϕm − ϕs)
=
1− e−xs
xs
km
xm
(
1− Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
)
−
{
Γ(km), xm
Γ(km)
+
km
xm
(
1− Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
)}
1− e−xs − xse−xs
xs
=
[
km
xm
(
1− Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
)
− 1− e
−xs − xse−xs
xs
]
e−xs
=
[
(1− e−xs)(kmxs − xm)
xmxs
+
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
− x
km−1
m e
−xm
Γ(km)
]
e−xs
=
[
(1− e−xs)((Mkm + S)xs − 1) +
Γ(km − 1, 1−SxsM )
Γ(km − 1) xs(1− Sxs)
]
e−xs
(1− Sxs)xs
where I have used (8) for the second equality, (8) and Γ(km+1,xm)Γ(km+1) =
Γ(km,xm)
Γ(km)
+ x
km
m e
−xm
Γ(km+1)
for the third
equality, and (1) and Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) =
Γ(km−1,xm)
Γ(km−1) +
xkm−1m e
−xm
Γ(km)
for the last equality. Define Λx(xs) as the
parenthesis terms in the last expression above for xs ∈ (0, 1S ) and km > 1. Then, it satisfies Λx(xs)→ 0
as xs → 0, Λx(xs)→ (1− e− 1S )MkmS > 0 as xs → 1S , and
dΛx(xs)
dxs
= (Mkm + S)(1− e−xs + xse−xs)−
Γ(km − 1, 1−SxsM )
Γ(km − 1) (2Sxs − 1) +
xkm−2m e
−xm
Γ(k − 1)
Sxs(1− Sxs)
M
= Mkm(1− e−xs + xse−xs) + S(1− e−xs + kxse−xs)−
Γ(km − 1, 1−SxsM )
Γ(km − 1) (Sxs(km + 1)− 1)
> Mkm(1− e−xs + xse−xs) + S(1− e−xs + kxse−xs)− e−xs(Sxs(km + 1)− 1)
= Mkm(1− e−xs + xse−xs) + S(1− e−xs − xse−xs) + e−xs
> 0,
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where I have used Γ(km−1,xm)Γ(km−1) <
Γ(km,xm)
Γ(km)
(= e−xs by (8)) for the second inequality. This implies
Λx(xs) > 0 for all x∈(0, 1S ) given km > 1. Hence, ϕ
m − ϕs > 0 and so pm − ps > 0 for all km > 1 and
S,M ∈ (0,∞). Since pm − ps = 0 when km = 1, this proves the claims in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
 Retail price of middlemen pm: For the expositional ease, let
∇1 ≡ xm
km
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
; ∇2 ≡ 1− Γ(km + 1, xm)Γ(km + 1) .
Differentiating pm (= ϕm(xm, km)) with respect to km ∈ [1,∞) ⊂ R+,
(∇1 +∇2)2 dϕ
m(xm, km)
dkm
= (∇1 +∇2)2 d
dkm
( ∇2
∇1 +∇2
)
= −∇1
∂ Γ(km+1,xm)Γ(km+1)
∂km
+∇2
∇1
km
− xm
km
∂ Γ(km,xm)Γ(km)
∂km
+ dxm
dkm
(
(∇1 +∇2) x
km
m e
−xm
Γ(km + 1)
− ∇1∇2
xm
)
.
In Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, it has been shown that
dxm
dkm
=
∂(Γ(km,xm)/Γ(km))
∂km
xkm−1m e−xm
Γ(km)
+Me−xs
,
where, as already mentioned in the text, I used here the normalization S = 1.
I now evaluate the above derivatives at km = 1. Let x ≡ xm = xs = 1/(M + 1) ∈ (0, 1) at km = 1.
Observe that
∂(Γ(km, x)/Γ(km))
∂km |km=1
=
∂Γ(km, x)/∂km
Γ(km) |km=1
− Γ(km, x)
Γ(km)
∂Γ(km)/∂km
Γ(km) |km=1
= e−x lnx+ E1(x) + e−xγ,
where in the second equality I have used:
∂Γ(km, x)/∂km
Γ(km) |km=1
=
∂Γ(km, x)
∂km |km=1
= e−x lnx+ E1(x);
∂Γ(km)/∂km
Γ(km) |km=1
= −γ
(see Geddes, Glasser, Moore, and Scott (1990) for the former, and Abramowitz and Stegun (1964)
p.228 for the latter, for example), where
E1(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−t
t
dt
is the exponential integral and γ (= 0.5772..) is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Similarly, observe that
∂(Γ(km + 1, x)/Γ(km + 1))
∂km |km=1
=
∂
∂km
(
Γ(km, x)
Γ(km)
+
xkme−x
Γ(km + 1)
)
|km=1
= e−x(1 + x)(lnx+ γ)− xe−x + E1(x).
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Applying these derivative expressions, and noting ∇1 = xe−x and ∇2 = 1− e−x − xe−x when km = 1,
one obtains
(∇1 +∇2)2 dϕ
m(x, km)
dkm |km=1
= −xe−x (E1(x)(ex − x)− 1 + e−x + lnx+ γ)+ x− 1 + e−x1 +M (E1(x) + e−x(lnx+ γ)) .
In the above expression, the terms in the first parenthesis, denoted by Θ1(x) ≡ E1(x)(ex−x)− 1+
e−x + lnx+ γ, satisfy:
lim
x→0
Θ1(x) = lim
x→0
(E1(x) + lnx) + γ = lim
x→0
Ein(x) = 0,
where I used limx→0E1(x)x = limx→0 xe−x = 0 (by the l’Hospital rule) in the first equality, and
E1(x) = −γ − lnx+ Ein(x) in the second equality, where
Ein(x) =
∫ x
0
(1− e−t)dt
t
is the entire function (see footnote 3, p.228 in Abramowitz and Stegun (1964));
dΘ1(x)
dx
= E1(x)(ex − 1) > 0.
Hence, Θ1 > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]. The terms in the second bracket, denoted by Θ2(x) ≡ E1(x) +
e−x(lnx+ γ), satisfy:
lim
x→0
Θ2(x) = lim
x→0
(E1(x) + lnx) + γ = lim
x→0
Ein(x) = 0; Θ2(1) = E1(1) + e−1γ > 1;
dΘ2(x)
dx
= −e−x(lnx+ γ) R 0⇐⇒ x Q e−γ ; Θ2(e−γ) = E1(e−γ) > 0.
Hence, Θ2(x) achieves the unique minimum at x = 0 within x ∈ [0, 1], which equals to zero, thereby
Θ2(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1].
Now, since Θ1(x) > 0, Θ2(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1], the condition of price increase is given by
dϕm(x,km)
dkm |km=1
> 0⇐⇒
M <
(x− 1 + e−x)Θ2(x)− xe−xΘ1(x)
xe−xΘ1(x)
. (13)
In what follows, I identify the values of x (= 1/(M + 1) ∈ (0, 1)) (and hence M ∈ (0,∞)) that satisfy
the condition of price increase (13). For this purpose, define
Ω(x) ≡ (x− 1 + e−x)Θ2(x)− e−xΘ1(x).
Note the inequality (13) holds true if and only if Ω(x) > 0. Ω(·) satisfies: limx→0 Ω(x) = 0;
Ω(1) = e−1(Θ2(1)−Θ1(1)) = e−1
[−E1(1)(e1 − 2) + (1− e−1)(1− γ)] > 0
since E1(1)(e1 − 2) ' 0.22 ∗ 0.72 ' 0.16 < 0.27 ' (1− e−1)(1− γ);
dΩ(x)
dx
= e−xΘ1(x) +
(
2(1− e−x)− x)e−x(lnx+ γ).
From the last expression, it follows that limx→0
dΩ(x)
dx = limx→0(2(1− e−x)− x) lnx = 0 (by using the
l’Hospital’s rule twice) and dΩ(x)dx > 0 for x > e
−γ . To identify the sign of the derivative for x ≤ e−γ ,
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suppose that Ω(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ (0, e−γ ]. Then, it has to hold that e−xΘ1(x) ≤ (x − 1 + e−x)Θ2(x),
which further implies
dΩ(x)
dx
≤ (x− 1 + e−x)Θ2(x) +
(
2(1− e−x)− x)e−x(lnx+ γ)
= (x− 1 + e−x)E1(x) + (1− e−x)e−x(lnx+ γ) ≡ Υ(x)
for x ∈ (0, e−γ ]. Observe that limx→0Υ(x) = 0 (by using the l’Hospital’s rule thrice on the first term
and twice on the second term) and Υ(e−γ) > 0. Further,
dΥ(x)
dx
= (1− e−x)Θ2(x)− (2− 3e−x)e−x(lnx+ γ) + e
−x(2(1− e−x)− x)
x
→ −∞ < 0
as x → 0. This implies there exists some x′ ∈ (0, e−γ) such that Υ(x′) = 0 and Υ(x) < 0 for x < x′.
The latter further implies dΩ(x)dx < 0 for x < x
′, a contradiction to dΩ(x)dx ≥ 0 (which is implied by
Ω(x) ≥ 0 and limx→0 Ω(x) = 0 for an interval of x close to 0). Hence, we must have Ω(x) < 0 for an
interval x close to zero. As Ω(x) is continuous in x ∈ (0, 1) and Ω(1) > 0, this implies that there exists
some x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that Ω(x∗) = 0 and Ω(x) < 0 for x ∈ (0, x∗).
Observe now that Ω(e−γ) = −(2−x−e−x−xe−x)E1(x)+e−x(1−e−x) |x=e−γ'0.56' −0.55∗0.49+
0.25 < 0. This implies, since Ω(x) is increasing in x ∈ (e−γ , 1), it has to be that x∗ ∈ (e−γ , 1). This
further implies that Ω(x) must cross the horizontal axis (of Ω(·) = 0) from below and only once at
x∗ ∈ (e−γ , 1). As limx→0 Ω(x) = 0 < Ω(1), it should hold that
Ω(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ x∗ ∈ (0, 1) and Ω(x) > 0 for x > x∗.
Therefore, the condition of price increase (13) holds true if and only if x ∈ (x∗, 1), and since x = X
when km = 1, this proves the first claim in the proposition with x∗ = X∗ ∈ (0, 1).
To prove the second claim, it is sufficient to observe that since xm → 1/M , xmη(xm, km) → 1/M ,
km∇2 → 0 as km →∞, it holds that ϕm(xm, km)→ 0 as km →∞. 
 Retail price of sellers ps: It is sufficient to observe that xs(·) is strictly decreasing in all km ≥ 1
(as shown in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1) and ps (= ϕs(·)) is strictly increasing in all xs ∈ (0, 1)
(as shown in the proof of Proposition 1). In the limit as km →∞, we have xs → 0 and so ϕs(xs, 1)→ 0.

 Retail market premium pm − ps: The above analysis shows that pm → c as km → ∞ and
ps → c as km →∞. Hence, pm − ps → 0 as km →∞. Since pm = ps when km = 1 and pm > ps when
1 < km <∞, this implies the price differential must be increasing (decreasing) in low (high) km. 
Proof of Proposition 4
 Retail price of middlemen pm: With the fixed total supply of middlemen G = Mkm, the only
modification appears in the adding-up restriction (1), which now becomes (with normalization S = 1)
G
km
xm + xs = 1.
This affects the analysis in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, so that now I have
dxm
dkm
=
∂(Γ(km,xm)/Γ(km))
∂km
+ Gxmk2m e
−xs
xkm−1m e−xm
Γ(km)
+ Gkm e
−xs
.
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Observe that there is an additional, positive term in the numerator of this expression. This modification
further affects the following parts of the analysis: the derivative in question becomes
(∇1 +∇2)2 dϕ
m(x, km)
dkm |km=1 & G=Mkm
= −xe−x (E1(x)(ex − x)− 1 + e−x + lnx+ γ)+ x− 1 + e−x1 +G (E1(x) + e−x(lnx+ γ) +Gxe−x) ,
where a positive term is added inside the second bracket; the condition for price increase (13) is then
modified to dϕ
m(x,km)
dkm |km=1 & G=Mkm
> 0⇐⇒
G
(
1− x− (1− e
−x)
Θ1(x)
)
<
(x− 1 + e−x)Θ2(x)− xe−xΘ1(x)
xe−xΘ1(x)
.
Observe here that the R.H.S. remains the same as before, while the L.H.S. is now multiplies by a new
term which is less than one. As G =M when km = 1, this implies that the above inequality holds for
all x = X > x∗ = X∗ ∈ (0, 1) (see the proof of Proposition 3) and so dϕm(x,km)dkm |km=1 & G=Mkm > 0 for
all x ∈ (x∗, 1). This proves the first claim for pm in the proposition.
The second claim can be shown by using the following property (see Temme (1996) p.285):
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
→ D as km →∞ (14)
where D ∈ [0, 1] satisfies: D = 1 if and only if xm < km; D = 0 if and only if xm > km.
Throughout the proof given below, keep in mind that with the fixed total supply G =Mkm ∈ (0,∞),
it has to be that M = G/km → 0 as km → ∞, thus xm → ∞ as km → ∞. There are three cases.
Consider first the case G < 1. Suppose xm > km as km →∞. This leads to Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) → 0 as km →∞
by (14) and so xs →∞ as km →∞ by (8). However, this contradicts to (1) which requires xs ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose xm < km as km →∞. Then, Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) → 1 as km →∞ by (14) and so xs → 0 as km →∞ by
(8). However, this contradicts to (1) and G < 1, or
M(xm − km) + xs = 1−G > 0
which requires xs > 0, if xm < km. Therefore, the only possible solution when G < 1 is xm = km as
km → ∞, which in turn leads to xs = 1 − G by (1), as is consistent with (14), requiring Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) =
e−xs ∈ (0, 1) as km →∞ and xm = km. In this solution, it holds that:
η(xm, km) =
Γ (km, xm)
Γ (km)
+
km
xm
(
1− Γ (km, xm)
Γ (km)
)
− x
km−1e−x
Γ(km)
→ 1 as km →∞
because x
km−1e−x
Γ(km)
→ 0 as km →∞ for any xmkm ∈ (0,∞);
ϕm(xm, km)→ 1− e−(1−G) as km →∞.
Consider next the case G = 1. Suppose xm < km as km →∞. Then, Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) → 1 as km →∞ by
(14) and so xs → 0 as km →∞ by (8). However, this contradicts to (1) and G = 1, or
M(xm − km) + xs = 1−G = 0
which requires xs > 0, if xm < km. Similarly, xm ≥ km as km →∞ cannot be the solution. Therefore,
there is no limiting solution as km →∞ with the fixed total supply G =Mkm when G = 1.
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Consider finally the case G > 1. Then, by (1),
M(xm − km) + xs = 1−G < 0,
implying that xm < km as km →∞, leading to Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) → 1 and xs → 0 by (8) and (14), is the only
solution. Therefore, 1 − Γ(km,xm)Γ(km) → 0 as km → ∞, which implies ϕm(·) → 0 as km → ∞ and thus
ϕm(·) > limkm→∞ ϕm(·) for all km ≥ 1.
Therefore, it has to hold that pm > c as km →∞ if and only if G < 1 or X = 1G+1 > X∗∗ = 12 . 
 Retail market premium pm − ps: With fixed G =Mkm, we have
dxs
dkm
= −
∂(Γ(km,xm)/Γ(km))
∂km
− xkm−1m e−xmΓ(km) 1−xsG
xkm−1m e−xm
Γ(km)
km
G + e
−xs
= −E1(x) + e
−x(lnx+ γ)− e−x 1−xM
ex(1 + 1M )
|km=1 & G=Mkm ,
and
(∇1 +∇2)2
(
dϕm(x, km)
dkm
− dϕ
s(x, 1)
dkm
)
|km=1 & G=Mkm
= −xe−xΘ1(x) + (x− 1 + e−x)Θ2(x)− (1− x)xe−x
where, as before, Θ1(x) ≡ E1(x)(ex−x)−1+e−x+lnx+γ > 0 and Θ2(x) ≡ E1(x)+e−x(lnx+γ) > 0.
Define the L.H.S. of the above derivative as
Ωf (x) ≡ E1(x)(−(1− e−x) + x2e−x) + xe−x(x− e−x)− (1− e−x)e−x(lnx+ γ).
Ωf (·) satisfies: limx→0 Ωf (x) = 0; Ωf (1) = −E1(1)(1 − 2e−1) + e−1(1 − e−1)(1 − γ) = −0.22 ∗ 0.26 +
0.23 ∗ 0.43 > 0;
dΩf (x)
dx
= −E1(x)e−x(1− x)2 + e−x(x(2− x+ e−x)− e−x) + (1− 2e−x)e−x(lnx+ γ).
Note dΩf (x)dx = e
−1 + (1− 2e−1)γ > 0 at x = 1.
Now, suppose that there exists some interval of x in the neighborhood of x = 0 such that Ωf (x) ≤ 0.
Then, within that interval of x, we must have
e−x(lnx+ γ) ≥ 1
1− ex
[
xe−x − 1− e
−x − x2e−x
1− e−x E1(x)
]
.
Applying this inequality to the expression of dΩf (x)dx , we have
dΩf (x)
dx
≥ 1− e
−x − xe−x
1− e−x
[
e−x(x− e−x) + xe
−x(1− e−x)
1− e−x − xe−x − (1− e
−x − xe−x)E1(x)
]
≡ 1− e
−x − xe−x
1− e−x Υf (x).
Observe that Υf (x) → 1 > 0 as x → 0. This implies that dΩf (x)dx ≥ 0 for an interval close to zero, if
Ωf (x) ≤ 0. However, this is impossible since Ωf (x)→ 0 as x→ 0. Hence, we must have Ωf (x) > 0 in
the interval close to x = 0.
This result further implies that if Ωf (x) < 0 in some interval of x ∈ (0, 1) then, since Ωf (1) > 0,
there must exist at least two points, denoted x− > x+ ∈ (0, 1), such that dΩf (x)dx = 0 at x = x−, x+
and Ωf (x−) < 0 < Ωf (x+). Keeping this in mind, suppose that there exists some x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
dΩf (x)
dx = 0 at x = x∗ (if not, then the claim holds true automatically). Then, we must have
Ωf (x∗) =
1− e−x∗ − x∗e−x∗
1− 2e−x∗
[
−(1− e−x∗ − x∗e−x∗)E1(x∗) + e−x∗(x∗ − e−x∗ + x∗(1− e
−x∗)
1− e−x∗ − x∗e−x∗ )
]
.
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Here, the terms in the parenthesis satisfy
ff (x) ≡ −(1− e−x − xe−x)E1(x) + e−x
(
x− e−x + x(1− e
−x)
1− e−x − xe−x
)
> −(1− e−x − xe−x)E1(x) + e−x
(
1− e−x) ≡ fr(x) > 0
for all x ∈ (0, 1], where fr(x) > 0 was introduced in the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, for all x ∈ (0, 1],
it holds that ff (x) > 0, and the result obtained there applies: since 1−e−x−xe−x > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]
and 1 − 2e−x > 0 if and only if x > ln(2) ∈ (0, 1), we must have Ωf (x∗−) < 0 < Ωf (x∗+) for some
x∗− < ln(2) < x∗+ if
dΩf (x)
dx = 0 at x = x∗−, x∗+, and so it is impossible to have x− > x+ ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying dΩf (x)dx = 0 at x = x−, x+ and Ωf (x−) < 0 < Ωf (x+).
All in all, the above covers all the possibilities of Ωf (x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ (0, 1], which turns out to be
impossible, and so we must have Ωf (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]. This proves the first claim.
The second claim follows from the result obtained in the proof of pm above: when G < 1, we have
ϕm(xm, km)− ϕs(xs, 1)→ e
−xs(xs − 1 + e−xs)
1− exs > 0
where xs → 1−G > 0, as km →∞; when G > 1,
ϕm(xm, km)− ϕs(xs, 1)→ 0.
as km →∞. Therefore, pm − ps > 0 as km →∞ if and only if G < 1 or X = 1G+1 > X∗∗ = 12 . 
Proof of Proposition 5
From the free entry condition (9), the fixed point condition for the equilibrium number of middlemen
M ∈ (0,∞) is given by
Φm(M, ·) ≡ 1− Γ(km + 1, xm)Γ(km + 1) =
c(1− β) + ck
1− c ≡ C (15)
where xm = xm(M) is strictly decreasing in M and satisfies xm → 0 as M →∞, as shown in Step 1 in
the proof of Proposition 1. It then follows that Φm = Φm(M, ·) is continuous and strictly decreasing
in M ∈ (0,∞) and satisfies Φm → 0 < C as M →∞. Therefore, with C¯ ≡ limM→0 Φm ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a unique M ∈ (0,∞) that satisfies (15) given C ∈ (0, C¯). The comparative statistics of C is
immediate: the equilibrium M is strictly decreasing in C satisfying M →∞ as C → 0 and M → 0 as
C → C¯.
For the comparative statics of km, observe that
dΦm
dkm
= − ∂
∂km
Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
+
xkmm e
−xm
Γ(km + 1)
dxm
dkm
.
Evaluating this derivative at km = 1 using the expression of ∂∂km
Γ(km+1,xm)
Γ(km+1)
|km=1 and dxmdkm |km=1
derived in the proof of Proposition 3, we have
dΦm
dkm |km=1
= −(1− x2)E1(x) + xe−x − (1 + x− x2)e−x(lnx+ γ) ≡ Ωm(x).
Observe that: limx→0 Ωm(x) = − limx→0(E1(x) + e−x(ln(x) + γ)) = 0; Ωm(1) = e−1(1− γ) > 0;
dΩm(x)
dx
= x
[
2E1(x)− e−x + (3− x)e−x(lnx+ γ)
] ≡ xfm(x).
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Here, the terms in the parenthesis satisfy fm(x)→ −∞ < 0 < 2E1(1)+ e−1(2γ− 1) = fm(1), implying
there exists some x·∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that fm(x·∗) ≥ 0 if and only if x ≥ x·∗. Since Ωm(0) < 0 < Ωm(1),
this implies Ωm(x) ≥ 0 if and only if x ≥ x·∗. As Φm(M) is monotone decreasing in M , the last result
implies that M is decreasing in low km if x = 1M+1 < x·∗ and is increasing in low km if x =
1
M+1 > x·∗.
As M is strictly decreasing in c, ck, this proves the claim in the proposition.
As for large km, notice that the L.H.S of the fixed point condition (15) should be a positive number
less than one (given C ∈ (0, C¯) < 1). This is the case if and only if xm = km and xs = 1 −Mkm > 0
as km → ∞ (see the property (14) in the proof of Proposition 4). This is possible only when M → 0
as km →∞. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Observe that the total number of trades satisfies
T − T = Mxmη(xm, km) + xsη(xx, 1)− S xsη(xs, 1)
= Mxm(η(xm, km)− η(xs, 1)) + (η(xs, 1)− η(xs, 1)),
where the second equality is by (1) and S xs =
1
Mkm+1
(Mkm + 1) = 1. For km = 1, it holds that
xm = xs = xs =
1
M+1 , implying η(xm, km) = η(xs, 1) and η(xs, 1) = η(xs, 1), thereby T = T . For
km > 1, η(xm, km) > η(xs, 1) and η(xs, 1) > η(xs, 1), since η(xs, 1) is decreasing in xs and xs < xs for
km > 1, thereby T > T .
Notice that the net welfare is strictly deceasing in all xs ∈ (0, 1). Since xs = xs when km = 1 and
xs < xs when km > 1, we must have W =W when km = 1 and W > W when km > 1. 
Proof of Proposition 7
To examine the effect of small km’s on T given fixed supply G =Mkm, observe that
dT
dkm |G=Mkm
=Mxm
[
∂
∂km
Γ(km, xm)
Γ(km)
− km
xm
∂
∂km
Γ(km + 1, xm)
Γ(km + 1)
]
.
Evaluating this derivative at km = 1,
dT
dkm |G=Mkm & km=1
=M
[
e−x(x− lnx− γ)− (1− x)E1(x)
]
.
where x ≡ xm = 1G+1 ∈ (0, 1) at km = 1. Define the parenthesis terms above as ΨT (x) for x ∈ (0, 1).
It satisfies: limx→0ΨT (x) = limx→0−(E1(x) + lnx + γ) = limx→0−Ein(x) = 0 (see the proof of
Proposition 3); limx→1ΨT (x) = e−1(1− γ) > 0;
dΨT (x)
dx
= −e−x(x− lnx− γ) + E1(x).
In the last expression, observe that dΨTdx → 0 as x→ 0 and dΨTdx → e−1(γ − 1) +E1(1) ' 0.37 ∗ (0.58−
1) + 0.22 ' 0.064 > 0, and that d2ΨTdx2 = −e−x(1− x+ lnx+ γ), satisfying d
2ΨT
dx2 → +∞ > 0 as x→ 0,
d2ΨT
dx2 → −e−1γ < 0 as x → 1 and d
2ΨT
dx2 = 0 at some xˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that xˆ = 1 + ln xˆ + γ. Then,
dΨT
dx = −e−xˆ + E1(xˆ) > 0 implies dΨTdx > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1), which further implies ΨT > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, 1) and so dTdkm |G=Mkm & km=1 > 0 for all G =Mkm ∈ (0,∞).
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Next, there are two cases for the effect of large values of km, given fixed supply. Suppose G > 1.
Then, xs → 0 as km → ∞ (see the proof of Proposition 4), and so T approaches to one, the highest
possible value, as km → ∞. Suppose next G < 1. Then, xs → 1 − G > 0 and M(xm − km) → 0
as km → ∞. The latter implies η(xm, km) → 1 and so Mxmη(xm, km) → Mkm = G as km → ∞.
This further means that the middlemen’s market approaches to the market clearing, which leads to the
maximum possible T , as km →∞. Therefore, in any case, T must be strictly increasing in sufficiently
large km.
Now, consider the net welfare W . Given values of fixed supply G =Mkm, observe that
dxs
dkm |G=Mkm
=
1−xs
G
xkm−1m e
−xm
Γ(km)
− ∂∂km
Γ(km,xm)
Γ(km)
km
G
xkm−1m e−xm
Γ(km)
+ e−xs
(see the proof of Proposition 4). The denominator of the above expression is clearly positive. To
examine the sign of the denominator terms evaluated at km = 1, define ΘW (x) ≡ e−x (−x+ lnx+ γ)+
E1(x) for x ∈ (0, 1). Note that dxsdkm < 0 at km = 1 if and only if ΘW (x) > 0. Observe that:
limx→0ΘW (x) = limx→0E1(x) + lnx + γ = limx→0Ein(x) = 0 (see the proof of Proposition 3);
limx→1ΘW (x) = e−1(γ − 1) + E1(1) ' 0.37 ∗ (0.58− 1) + 0.22 ' 0.064 > 0;
dΘW
dx
= −e−x(lnx+ γ − x+ 1).
The parenthesis terms in the last derivative are monotone increasing in x ∈ (0, 1), being negative as
x→ 0 and positive as x→ 1. Therefore, ΘW (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1), implying dxsdkm < 0 at km = 1.
As for large values of km, there are two cases. Consider first the case G > 1, where xs → 0 as
km → ∞. Then, W → 1−c1−β , the highest possible value, as km → ∞. Consider next the case G < 1
where xs → 1 − G > 0 as km → ∞. In this case, we have W → (1−c)(1−(1−G)e
−(1−G))
1−β <
1−c
1−β for all
G ∈ (0, 1) as km →∞. Therefore, W < 1−c1−β as km →∞ if and only if G < 1 or X = 1G+1 > X∗∗ = 12 .

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